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1. STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellants' Statement of the Case is largely accurate, but with one serious omission. 
Appellants' Brief states that on November 30,2009, the Respondent, Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC 
("BFU") filed a pleading " ... requesting the court enter an order confirming the arbitration 
awards ... " Appellants' Brief, p. 2. This is partially true, but incomplete. 
The Application and Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award (R., pp. 12-36) did seek 
the entry of an order confirming the arbitration award. It also explicitly sought entry of a judgment: 
WHEREFORE, BFU respectfully prays, and does move the Court 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-916, as follows: 
1. The Court enter an order confirming the Arbitration 
Awards pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-911. 
2. After confirmation of the Arbitration Awards, 
judgment be entered in favor of BFU in the following amounts: 
a. As to Award No.1, the principal sum of 
TWO HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND NINE 
HUNDRED FORTY-ONE and 011100 DOLLARS 
($292,941.01), plus interest at $66.57 per diem from 
October 1,2009 until paid. 
b. As to Award No.2, the principal sum of 
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN 
HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO and 001100 DOLLARS 
($159,762.00) under certain restrictions as set forth in the 
Arbitration Award, plus interest as allowed by law. 
(R., p. 15.) (Emphasis added.) 
This same request was reiterated in the Amended Application and Motion for 
Confirmation of Arbitration Award (R. pp. 37-41) filed on February 17,2010. 
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Appellants, Richard and Lisa Keane, Keane and Co. Construction, Inc., and R&L 
Developments, LLC (collectively "Keane") and their then counsel, Manderson Miles, filed a 
Reply to the Application and Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award on March 16, 2010. 
(R. p. 2.) This reply was not identified as a document for the record before this Court. A hearing 
was held on March 18,2010, and the trial court's Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R. pp. 
43-68) and judgment was entered on May 3, 2010. The trial court's order both confirmed the 
arbitration awards and entered money judgments as prayed for in BFU's applications CR., pp. 12-
36 and R. pp. 37-41). The trial court held: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUSTED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Arbitration Awards dated November 18, 2009, 
a true copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," and the 
Clarification Order of the Arbitrator dated January 20, 2010, a true 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B," is hereby confirmed 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-914. 
2. Bald Fat and Ugly LLC, have and recover from 
Richard A. Keane and Lisa A. Keane, husband and wife; R&L 
Developments, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company, and 
Keane and Co. Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, jointly 
and severally, a money judgment in the sum of ONE HUNDRED 
FIFTY FOUR THREE HUNDRED FORTY -SIX and 491100 
DOLLARS ($154,346.49), plus interest at eight percent (8%) from 
December 22, 2009 until paid. 
3. Bald Fat and Ugly LLC, have and recover from 
Richard A. Keane and Lisa A. Keane, husband and wife; R&L 
Developments, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company, and 
Keane and Co. Construction, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, jointly 
and severally, a money judgment in the sum of ONE HUNDRED 
FIFTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO 
and 001100 DOLLARS ($159,762.00) under certain restrictions as 
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set forth in the Arbitration Award, plus interest at eight percent (8 
%) from November 18,2009. 
(R. p. 44.) (Emphasis added.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Keane improperly raised the issue of the trial court's Order as an 
enforceable judgment for the first time on appeal. 
B. Whether BFU is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal per contract and/or 
Idaho Code § 12-120 or Idaho Code § 12-120 (3). 
III. STANDARD 
On appeal from a finding of contempt, this Court does not weigh the evidence, but rather 
reviews the trial court's factual findings to determine if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243, 159 P.3d 877, 880 (2007). The 
determination of whether a sanction or penalty should be imposed is within the discretion of the 
trial court and is only reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary of Argument. 
1. Keane was in Contempt of the Trial Court's Order and Judgment. 
In 2005, Keane entered into a Mediated Settlement Agreement (R. pp. 59-65) 
obligating him to pay certain moneys to BFU and to perform certain work on a building 
contract dated in 2002. 
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Keane's failure to perform as promised under that Mediated Settlement 
Agreement CR. pp. 59-65) led to the arbitration before Lynden O. Rasmussen CR. pp. 53-
57). Mr. Rasmussen's Arbitration Awards CR. pp. 18-23 and 67-68) obligated Keane to 
pay the money he agreed to pay in 2005 and also pay additional funds to finish the work 
he was bound to do. Keane failed to perform as agreed in 2005 by Mr. Rasmussen or as 
ordered by the trial court in 2009. 
The trial court confirmed Mr. Rasmussen's Arbitration Awards in its Order 
Confirming Arbitration Awards CR. pp. 43-68) and, in separate paragraphs, awarded a 
money judgment against Keane for the purely monetary award and a judgment against 
him for funds to complete the repairs. CR. p. 44.) 
Keane still refused to honor the Mediated Settlement Agreement CR. pp. 59-65); 
Mr. Rasmussen's Arbitration Awards CR. pp. 18-23 and 67-68), and the trial court's 
Order Confirming Arbitration Awards CR. pp. 43-68), leading to the contempt 
proceedings. 
Keane is a very wealthy man and conceded he had the ability to pay as ordered by 
the trial court CTR., Trial on Contempt Motion of September 9, 2011, pp. 165-178). 
Given that Keane had knowingly refused to abide by the trial court's Order 
Confirming Arbitration Awards CR. pp. 43-68), when he clearly had the ability to pay, the 
trial court found Keane in contempt and gave him additional time to pay the arbitration 
awards CR. pp. 178-187). 
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B. Trial Court Did Enter Money Judgments Against Keane. 
As discussed below, BFU believes this is an ulli1ecessary issue - a so-called red herring, 
because any order may be the subject of a finding of contempt. However, for full treatment of 
the issues on appeal, BFU offers the following analysis. 
Under analyses of this Court, the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R. pp. 43-68) 
may indeed be a "judgment." Recently, this Court sought to clarify its definition of what 
constitutes a judgment, at least in general terms, making it clear that formalities of form and style 
were not determinative. The Court said: 
As a general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that 
ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, 
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties. It 
must be a separate document that on its face states the relief 
granted or denied. Although it would be better practice to entitle 
the document' Judgment' in order to avoid any confusion, the title 
is not determinative. Whether an instrument is an appealable order 
or judgment must be determined by its content and substance, and 
not by its title. 
Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 620, 226 P.3d 1263, 1267 (2010) 
(Emphasis added). Although the Court referred to generalized formalities as to language and 
exclusion of reasoning in judgments, it expressly provided that technical formatting does not 
control, and the Court did not reverse or mention its 2009 decision in an arbitration judgment 
case, Storey Const. Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 409, 224 P.3d 468,476 (2009) (as opposed to 
other cases it expressly mentioned and disavowed or criticized). 
In Storey Construction, this Court confirmed that the title or specific formatting of an 
arbitration confirmation order does not control the 'Judgment" analysis. The Court appeared 
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satisfied that the trial court's Order Affirming Arbitration Award was a judgment, because it 
resolved the substance of the matter, and, in part, because the order was prefaced with "the Court 
does now ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as follows," before going on to adopt and affirm 
the arbitration award. Storey Canst. Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 409, 224 P.3d 468, 476 
(2009). The Court noted that "[t]he wording 'order, adjudge, and decree' is typically used in 
judgments, and then went on to analyze the matter under the assumption that the order 
confirming the arbitration award was therefore a "judgment." Id. at 410, 477. 
In this case, the trial cOUli's Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R. pp. 43-68) 
resolved the core matter at issue and was prefaced with "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS." (R. p. 44.) Even though the designation of 
"judgment" is not necessary for contempt purposes, this was, in reality, a judgment; particularly 
given where the word "judgment" can be found in the trial court's grant of the requested relief. 
(R. p. 44.) 
C. Contempt May Be Found for Violation of Any Order or Process of the Court, 
Even If There was No Judgment. 
1. The Contempt Power of the Court IS Broad and Encompasses Any 
Judgment, Order or Process of the Court. 
Idaho Code § 7-601, in recognizing the existing contempt power of the court, 
specifically recognizes that "[t]he following acts or omissions in respect to a court of 
justice, or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the court: . . . . 
Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court." Id. (Emphasis 
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added.) As the statute clearly recognizes, failure to comply with an order or process of 
the court constitutes contempt, wholly independent of whether there is a 'Judgment," 
which is listed in the disjunctive with order and process. The trial court's Order 
Confirming Arbitration Awards CR., pp. 43-68) was clearly an "order," and the entire 
mechanism for infusing an arbitration award with judicial authority is clearly a "process," 
both of which require compliance by the parties. 
The scope and purpose of the contempt power is discussed in In re Contempt of 
Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 579, 733 P.2d 795, 800 CCt. App. 1987). The Court of Appeals 
stated: 
Contempt orders frequently result from the refusal of the 
contemnor to obey the express order of a court. As we have 
explained, the contemnor may challenge the procedure by 
which the contempt is adjudicated. He may argue that there 
is no substantial evidence to support the finding that he 
knowingly violated a court order. He may even challenge 
the penalties imposed. However, he may not knowingly 
ignore an order of the court, even though he believes it to 
be incorrect, and then contest the validity of the underlying 
order on appeal from a finding of criminal contempt. See 
Barnett v. Reed, supra; Mathison v. Felton, supra. This rule 
is based upon sound foundations of public policy. A trial 
court may make numerous rulings and issue a substantial 
number of orders during the course of a lawsuit. If a party 
were free to disobey any order with which he or she 
disagreed, the entire judicial process would break down. As 
the United States Supreme Court explained in Maness v. 
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 
(1975): 
We begin with the basic proposition that all orders 
and judgments of courts must be complied with 
promptly. If a person to whom a court directs an 
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order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is 
to appeal, but absent a stay, to comply promptly 
with the order pending appeal. Persons who make 
private determinations of the law and refuse to obey 
an order generally risk criminal contempt even if 
the order is ultimately ruled incorrect. ... Such orders 
must be complied with promptly and completely, 
for the alternative would be to frustrate and disrupt 
the progress of the trial with issues collateral to the 
central questions in litigation. This does not mean, 
of course, that every ruling by a presiding judge 
must be accepted in silence. Counsel may object to 
a ruling. An objection alerts opposing counsel and 
the court to an issue so that the former may respond 
and the latter may be fully advised before ruling. 
[Citations omitted.] But, once the court has ruled, 
counsel and others involved in the action must abide 
by the ruling and comply with the court's orders .... 
Remedies for judicial error may be cumbersome but 
the injury flowing from an error generally is not 
irreparable, and orderly processes are imperative to 
the operation of the adversary system of justice. 
ld. (Footnote omitted.) 
Of critical importance is the fact that Idaho Code § 7-919 expressly makes "[a]n 
order confirming or denying confirmation of an award" an appealable order. ld. 
(Emphasis added.) No more is needed to confirm that an order confirming an arbitration 
award has all the finality and judicial authority needed to bring to bear the trial court's 
broad contempt power. Therefore, however styled, the Order Confirming Arbitration 
Awards (R. pp. 43-68) had the exact same effect as a document styled as a 'judgment" 
would have, for the purposes of contempt. 
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Additionally, as referenced above, the court's inherent contempt power is merely 
recognized by, and not restricted to, even the broad language of Idaho Code § 7-601, 
making it even more clear the contempt power exists without a "judgment." The Court's 
broad inherent contempt power is clearly not limited by Idaho Code § 7-601, or any other 
statutory authority, because, "[w]hile this power has been recognized by statute, ... its 
source lies in the Constitution, ID. Const. art. 5, § 2, and the common law." Marks v. 
Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560,566,671 P.2d 473,479 (1983); see also, Watson v. Weick (In re 
Weick), 142 Idaho 275, 278, 127 P.3d 178, 181 (2005). Therefore, no tortured construct 
Keane poses regarding Idaho's writ and collection statutes, or any other statute or rule, 
can alter the court's inherent authority to coerce compliance with its directives, however 
those directives are styled. 
Keane's argument, taken to its logical extension, posits that a party has no duty to 
act pursuant to court order or process until a document styled as a "judgment" has been 
entered. If that were true, then no person would be required to comply with a court's 
temporary restraining order or other rule, process, or order of the court. A party would 
need not comply with a court's in-court, verbal order to disclose evidence, cease 
disruptive or abusive conduct, or take or refrain from other action. For example, a court 
could not impose incarceration on a witness refusing in open court to testify without 
lawful privilege. After all, such verbal orders could never be styled as "judgments," 
because they are not in written form at all. 
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This notion is directly contrary to the notion of the court's inherent powers and 
Idaho precedent. For example, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 
Idaho 630, 888 P.2d 804 eCt. App. 1995), upheld the trial court's finding of contempt 
where a party failed to comply with the court's interlocutory order to execute a settlement 
agreement consistent with the settlement the parties had orally articulated on the record. 
Id. Even though the underlying order to execute the agreement was clearly not a 
judgment, even though the trial court had ruled it was a non-appealable interlocutory 
order, and even though the Court of Appeals ultimately held the order to execute the 
agreement was inappropriate, the Court of Appeals nonetheless upheld the finding of 
contempt and confirmed that a party must comply with orders ultimately found to be 
improper. Id at 633, 637, 888 P.2d at 807, 811. If a party were free to disobey any order 
with which he or she disagreed, the entire judicial process would break down. Id 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals upheld a finding of contempt based on failure to 
comply with a temporary restraining order, which was clearly not stylized as a judgment, 
in In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 579-80, 733 P.2d 795, 800-01 eCt. App. 
1987). The court, with extended quotation from the United States Supreme Court, made 
it clear why a party is not fl"ee to disregard a court's directives with which the party 
disagrees, even when the party believes the order is unlawful, or by extension when the 
party seeks to hide behind a form-over-substance argument about proper styling of the 
court's order. A party may not do so, because the very foundations of our system of 
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justice depend on parties respecting the judicial power and all directives, processes, or 
orders. ld. 
Finally, Keane's argument regarding the existence of a "judgment" for collection 
of what Keane would have the court believe is a bare debt, is disingenuous and belied by 
Keane's own actions. As both parties agree, there were two separate awards contained in 
Mr. Rasmussen's Arbitration Awards (R. pp. 18-23 and 67-68) - the first was a pure cash 
award/debt, and the second was a specific directive to pay funds to the Risley Law Office 
trust account to ensure funding of proper work to be completed by others in a ongoing 
fashion, with the arbitrator specifically declining to allow Keane to complete the work. 
(R. pp. 22-23.) Keane now wants to ignore the second award directive and simply argue 
that what he really owed was a simple money judgment under the first award. Yet, 
Keane himself testified that he had made large cash payments nearly retiring the first 
award, and that he had declined to attempt to direct that those payments be applied to 
anything other than the first award. (TR., Trial on Contempt Motion of September 9, 
2011, pp. 163 L.7 - 164 L.S.) If this Court were to accept Keane's 'judgment" argument, 
it would essentially resurrect the bulk of the first arbitration award and make it the core of 
the case, rather than the second award, which was really the issue driving the contempt 
finding (R. pp. 178-187). 
In partial summary, failure to obey any order or process of the court may be 
grounds for contempt, regardless of whether a "judgment" has been entered. 
11 
D. Keane Was in Contempt Based on Substantial and Competent Evidence Before 
the Court. 
This Court does not weigh the evidence of contempt, but rather reviews the trial court's 
findings to determine if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Steiner v. 
Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240,243, 159 P.3d 877,880 (2007). 
In this case, a finding of contempt required a finding that Keane: 1) committed 
"[d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court," Idaho Code § 7-601(5); 
2) with knowledge of the order, Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243, 159 P.3d 877, 880 
(2007); and 3) had the present ability to comply with the violated portion of the order required by 
the sanction, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 75(j). 
1. Disobedience of the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards. 
The Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68) was entered April 30, 
2010. A full sixteen months later, at the time of the contempt trial, Keane had failed to 
undertake serious efforts to liquidate his sizeable assets and make the required payments 
to the Risley Law Office trust account, seeking instead to attempt to circumvent the 
Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68) by performing the work himself. 
The trial court found that Keane has millions of dollars in equity in assets, many 
of which he has done little or nothing to sell to satisfy his obligation to pay money into 
the Risley Law Office trust account. (R., p. 185.) This finding is also well supported by 
Keane's own testimony. (TR., Trial on Contempt Motion of September 9,2011, pp. 154. 
LL. 19 and 166-174.) 
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Similarly, the evidence supports the trial court's finding of contempt (R. pp. 178-
187) and exercise of discretion in ordering compliance with the original order because, by 
Keane's own testimony (TR., Trial on Contempt Motion of September 9,2011, pp. 176), 
he would undertake more urgent efforts to sell property and pay the trust amounts within 
30 days if ultimately ordered to do so by the trial court as a result of the September 9, 
2011 trial. Essentially, by Keane's own admissions, he had failed to take the directive of 
the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68) seriously, and an order of 
contempt was necessary to prompt him to comply. 
In his argument about whether a "judgment" was entered, Keane laments the great 
detail contained in the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68); however, it 
is this very presence of detail and clear personal directive to pay funds to the Risley Law 
Office trust account that made the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68) 
so very directive and which makes the contempt so very clear (R. pp. 178-187). The 
Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68), which incorporates Rasmussen's 
Arbitration Awards (R. pp. 18-23), as well as his clarification letter (R. pp. 67-68), and 
other documents, makes it clear that the relief granted to BFU was a process, rather than a 
raw dollar amount per se - the process would ensure proper funds were in the Risley Law 
Office trust account to pay for PROPER repairs by someone other than Keane; allow for 
prompt payment to avoid mechanics/materialman's liens; prevent BFU from incurring 
contract liability to third parties, and then allow for reimbursement to Keane in the event 
the work was less expensive than anticipated. This was a clear personal directive that 
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was much more complicated and different in nature than an in-rem judgment for money. 
Keane clearly failed to comply with the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 
43-68). 
2. Knowledge of the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards. 
Keane acknowledged that he attended the arbitration and was aware that it 
resulted in two separate awards against him. (TR., Trial on Contempt Motion of 
September 9, 2011, p. 125, LL. 4-12.) Keane similarly had actual knowledge of the 
arbitrator's January 20, 2010 Clarification Order. (TR., Trial on Contempt Motion of 
September 9, 2011, pp. 152-54.) Finally, both the arbitrator's awards (R. pp. 18-23) and 
clarification letter (R. pp. 67-68) were incorporated by reference in the Order Confirming 
Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68). 
3. Present Ability to Comply with Portions of the Order Directed. 
The third element requires that the "contemnor has the present ability to comply 
with the order violated, or with that portion of it required by the sanction." Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure 75(j) (Emphasis added). The trial court's Findings of Fact on the Trial 
for Contempt (R. p. 178-187) directed Keane to comply with the original Order 
Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68) within 30 days. The trial court's finding 
that Keane had present ability to comply is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. The same facts that bear on the disobedience factor, bear on the ability to 
comply. Keane simply had not complied with the original Order Confirming Arbitration 
Awards (R., pp. 43-68) and had not undertaken good faith efforts to comply with it. The 
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sanction ordered Keane to undertake those efforts and comply. Keane admitted he could 
comply if he wanted to badly enough. (TR., Trial on Contempt Motion of September 9, 
2011, pp 166-74.) In fact, he conceded he could take action ifhe were ordered to do so 
by the trial court as a result of the contempt proceedings. (TR., Trial on Contempt 
Motion of September 9, 2011, p. 176.) He simply offered no explanation as to why he 
had failed to list or sell the property at a low enough price to ensure prompt sale. (TR., 
Trial on Contempt Motion of September 9,2011, p. 140, LL. 1-16.) 
The trial court ordered payment and found payment could have been presently 
made but was willfully avoided. The court, being the trial court and finder of fact, was in 
the unique position to assess witnesses and evidence and concluded that contempt had 
been committed and that sanctions were appropriate. Substantial evidence supports the 
trial court's findings in light of its unique position to assess the disobedient behavior 
and/or demeanor of the witnesses and Keane. This Court does not weigh the evidence, 
but rather reviews the trial court's findings to determine if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243, 159 P.3d 
877, 880 (2007). This Court should affirm. 
E. Matter and Type of Coercion/Sanction. 
The determination of sanctions is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Steiner v. 
Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243, 159 P.3d 877,880 (2007). In light of the evidence discussed above, 
the court ordered Keane to comply with the original Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., 
pp. 43-68) within 30 days. As this Court has held, Idaho Code § 7-611 "does not preclude 
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alternative civil sanctions" and does not circumscribe the trial court's inherent power "to compel 
obedience to its judgments, orders and process." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 247, 159 
P .3d 877, 884 (2007). This type of sanction is well within the Court's power. 
At this point, Keane offers up another red herring, arguing that the Court's sanction is 
somehow not "civil" because it is not a conditional sanction of additional penalties if compliance 
with the original order is not forthcoming. Keane apparently argues the sanction was not bad 
enough to be civil. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 75 civil/criminal sanction distinction simply 
distinguishes between punitive and rehabilitative sanctions, rather than seeking to limit the way 
in which a court may fashion a rehabilitative, conditional sanction. In a criminal contempt, the 
contempt cannot be purged and the sanction cannot be avoided simply by compliance. In this 
case, the contempt can be purged and additional sanctions avoided by compliance - it just so 
happens that the "sanction" is the very same thing as the underlying responsibility Keane had 
under the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards (R., pp. 43-68). This is completely permissible. 
In Steiner, this Court specifically upheld such a sanction, saying "[i]n this case, the 
district court simply ordered the parties to continue abiding by the terms of the Stipulated 
Judgment-terms to which they were already bound. This clearly falls within the judge's 
authority to compel obedience, and therefore, the order is upheld." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 
240, 247, 159 P.3d 877, 884 (2007). Similarly, the trial court in this case ordered Keane to do 
what he had been ordered to do 16 months earlier, and to do so within 30 days. 
Keane admitted he could comply if he wanted to badly enough. (TR., Trial on Contempt 
Motion of September 9,2011, pp 166-74.). He simply offered no explanation as to why he had 
16 
failed to list or sell the property at a low enough price to ensure prompt sale. (TR., Trial on 
Contempt Motion of September 9, 2011, p. 140, LL. 1-16.) 
In light of these circumstances, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and should 
be upheld. 
F. The Order Striking Keane's Affirmative Defenses Was Appropriate. 
The decision to strike untimely filings rests within the trial court's discretion and will not 
be oveliurned absent abuse of that discretion. E.g., Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 38496,2012 WL 
1557284 (Idaho May 4, 2012) (late filing of an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment 
motion; not yet released for inclusion in permanent law reports). Here, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion. As the black and white transcript of the May 26, 2011, hearing shows, and 
as the trial court found in light if its superior position borne of having been present to understand 
not only the text but the context of that hearing, the trial court neither granted an extension of 
time to file a response or mislead Keane regarding the timeline for filing. Ultimately, it is a 
party's duty to know the timelines for filing responsive documents, and absent an exercise of the 
court's discretion to allow a late filing, the party is bound to the timelines set forth in the rules. 
Notably, this Court has dismissed an appeal, and declined to hear an appellant's case for 
failure to timely file a motion for new trial and notice of appeal, even though part of the reason 
was error on the part of the clerk of the court. Respondents contend that the appellants' motion 
for a new trial and their notice of appeal were filed too late and that this appeal should be 
dismissed accordingly. Swayne v. Otto, 99 Idaho 271, 272,580 P.2d 1296, 1297 (1978). 
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Even if the trial court abused its discretion, it was harmless error. During the trial on 
contempt and via Appellants' briefing in this appeal, Keane has essentially sought to put much of 
the substance of its proposed late response at issue. The trial court found those arguments 
unpersuasive, and as can be seen from the analysis above, they are largely irrelevant. Therefore, 
the contempt order (R. pp. 178-187) would have issued and should be sustained on appeal, even 
considering those arguments. Any error in striking the tardy response was harmless, and this 
Court should affirm. 
V. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Keane has improperly raised the issue of the trial court's Order as an enforceable 
judgment for the first time on appeal. 
Keane's trial counsel raised written defenses in his Response to Motion for Contempt (R. 
p. 152-156) that essentially raised three issues: (1) the inability to comply; (2) standing, and (3) 
that the work to be paid for had already been done by Keane. (R. p. 153.) 
During a full day of trial, no suggestion was made that the Order Confirming Arbitration 
Awards (R., pp. 43-68) sought to be enforced by contempt was not a judgment or was otherwise 
not an enforceable order. 
This Court has noted it will not hear an issue for the first time on appeal, saying: "[T]o 
properly raise an issue on appeal ... the issue must have been raised in the court below .... " 
Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 436,80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) (citing McPheters v. Maile, 
138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003). Here, Keane did not raise an argument before the 
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trial court on whether the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards was enforceable as a judgment. 
This Court should, therefore, not consider Keane's new argument on appeal. 
B. Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
While the discretionary Uniform Arbitration Act attorney fee provision (Idaho Code § 7-
914) controls in the trial court proceedings for confirmation of an arbitration award, it appears 
the more mandatory provision of Idaho Code § 12-120 (3) applies in all related trial matters not 
directly involving confirmation of an award, as well as an appeal such as this one. See, Grease 
Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 587-88, 226 P.3d 524, 529-30 (2010). 
The Court should determine BFU to be the prevailing party in this appeal and should 
award attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as well as costs pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Keane has delayed performance of his 2002 contract for a decade. He has refused to 
perform after having reached a mediated settlement agreement; he refused to perform after the 
arbitrator ordered him to; and he continued to refuse after the trial court confirmed the 
arbitrator's awards and ordered, adjudged and decreed that he do so, all while declaring himself 
to be a wealthy man and well able to perform as promised. 
His excuse for not paying now is an improper form of the trial cOUli's Order Confirming 
Arbitration Awards, not its substance. 
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The trial court judge had competent evidence before him of Keane's willful and knowing 
disobedience of the Court's Order Confirming Arbitration Awards and properly found him in 
contempt. 
BFU respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's holding, and award BFU 
its attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 1 i h day of August, 2012. 
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